The West’s intervention in Libya and the on-going violence in Syria have placed a renewed spotlight on the principle of the responsibility to protect (R2P) human life. In this first post of a two part series, Dr Edward Newman argues that far from emerging into an new international ‘norm’, R2P is exposing fissures in a changing global order.
This post is the second contribution to the research agenda series on polsis.org, which this month is focusing on Security Studies.
After a decade of academic and policy debate the principle of the responsibility to protect human life (R2P) appears to have won broad support around a clear definition that is relevant to a narrow and specific range of atrocities: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The 2005 UN World Summit Outcome, in theory representing all UN members, defined R2P strictly in the context of the UN Charter and Security Council authority, on a case by case basis, and emphasized the need for early warning and the prevention of such atrocities. The UN Secretary-General, in turn, formulated a proposal to implement R2P around three themes: the protection responsibilities of the state, international assistance and capacity-building, and timely and decisive response. According to this, R2P is “firmly anchored in well-established principles of international law”, including the bedrock of state sovereignty and – except in the most exceptional circumstances – non-interference. The emphasis is upon prevention and capacity building, and away from the use of armed force for human protection. It is therefore hoped that R2P will finally shed its association with the concept of ‘humanitarian intervention’. Recent diplomatic and academic debate has also had the effect of testing and defining the scope and limits of R2P, especially in terms of its interventionist connotations: it thus cannot be legitimately invoked in response to issues of poor governance or the denial of democracy, or in situations of natural disasters where governments are unwilling or unable to meet the humanitarian needs of victims, or in relation to human rights issues more broadly, or – as in the cases of the US-led intervention into Iraq or Russia’s intervention into Georgia – as a thin veil for geostrategic hegemony. It works best – for example in Kenya following contested elections and communal conflict in early 2008 – when it galvanizes the international community to assist local actors to peacefully resolve crises through a range of concerted activities. R2P, although it does make reference to action through the Security Council if national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from atrocities – as happened in Libya in 2011 – is more about promoting and assisting states to implement existing legal obligations and human rights, and strengthening the norm of human protection.
Defined in this way, R2P – unlike humanitarian intervention – should not be seen as being in tension with existing norms of world order; as the Secretary-General’s report suggested, in line with the World Summit Outcome, “the responsibility to protect seeks to strengthen sovereignty, not weaken it.” The principle should therefore be seen firmly within the rules of procedure and the Charter of the UN, the embodiment of the Westphalian, pluralist society of states.
However, R2P remains controversial in the way that it is conceptualized, defined and invoked, and the nature of these controversies suggest that R2P is indeed problematized by its normative implications for world order. Despite the efforts of R2P advocates – who spend a considerable amount of their time refuting the idea that R2P is about humanitarian intervention and that it is in tension with sovereignty – many governments and commentators raise fundamental objections to R2P. Following the celebrated 2005 UN endorsement of R2P a number of governments have raised concerns and reservations about the principle, and it is notable that these reservations are seen in states – such as China, India, Russia, South Africa, Brazil, amongst others – which are both increasing in influence internationally and which do not reflect the prevailing liberal axis of states which promote norms such as R2P.
The controversies surrounding R2P – including the implementation of Resolution 1973 on Libya – can be related to different ideas of world order. R2P continues to have implications for world order in a number of ways. Firstly, it is ultimately unrealistic to define the application of R2P primarily in terms of assistance and capacity building because the majority of atrocities continue to be perpetrated by states or state-sponsored actors – or as a result of state incapacity or indifference – and so an effective response to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity would often necessarily involve confronting states and using coercion, including force, with implications for state sovereignty. Moreover, since these atrocities often occur in situations of upheaval or insurgency, intervention inevitably becomes associated with regime change because it influences the outcome of local conflict. In the most egregious cases the first two pillars of the Secretary-General’s agenda – promoting the protection responsibilities of the state, and international assistance and capacity-building – will not apply because the states concerned will be recalcitrant, as Syria was in 2011 and 2012. This leaves us with pillar three – reaction and in theory intervening to prevent or stop atrocities – which raises a range of perennial controversies associated with humanitarian intervention, including a tension between justice and international order. Whilst most world leaders might support R2P in its most abstract form, there are fundamental disagreements about its implementation, especially in relation to difficult cases. Ultimately this points to a tension between pluralist approaches to human rights challenges – which are underpinned by a Westphalian, statist worldview – and a more solidarist worldview which has a contingent view of sovereignty.
Secondly, and perhaps more significantly, the way that R2P debates have been conducted and decisions have been taken in organizations such as the UN Security Council has raised problems relating to collective decision-making and influence in international politics. From this perspective controversies regarding R2P are not necessarily about the implications it holds for the Westphalian international order, but rather in terms of how power is legitimately exercised – or illegitimately abused – in an evolving international balance of power. Thus, the concerns of China, India, Russia, South Africa and Brazil, and others, relate to how R2P is defined and implemented in organizations such as the UN, reflecting broader tensions about the legitimacy and authority of norm diffusion and institutions in international politics. Therefore, rather than R2P emerging into a new norm or world order, it is in fact exposing broader fissures in a transitional world order characterized by rising and declining power and influence. Remaining reservations about R2P around the world are therefore not merely a reflection of lingering concerns or confusion about the principle’s interventionist connotations. Moreover, R2P has become hostage to broader tensions relating to international order that make progress on the protection agenda difficult.
Dr Edward Newman is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Birmingham, UK. His current research and teaching focus upon security studies, including critical approaches and ‘human security’; intrastate armed conflict, civil war, and political violence; international organizations and multilateralism; and peacebuilding and reconstruction in conflict-prone and post-conflict societies. His personal website is available here.
Leadership, Diplomacy, and Institutional Design: A Model for Understanding the Arab Spring?
Across the Middle East and North Africa, the impact of the Arab Spring has been as varied as it has been profound. Professor Stefan Wolff discusses three ‘essential ingredients’ that will determine whether regime transitions can be managed successfully.
The Arab Spring has ushered in a new period of political development across the Middle East and North Africa, but not one that has generated only positive outcomes. Overthrowing the Gadhafi regime in Libya was extremely costly in human life; yet such success has, to date, eluded the protest movement in Syria. Where revolutions succeeded, be it through protest, a military campaign, or a negotiated transition, outcomes, remain uncertain and are often far from what regime opponents within countries and outside expected, such as in Egypt and Yemen.
On the one hand, the journey to democracy motivated a considerable number of the protesters who took to the streets across the Arab world from late 2010; early 2011 onwards has proved much more difficult. Negotiated transitions, as in Yemen and Egypt, have seen an only incomplete removal of old elites and slow progress, if any, towards establishing conditions in which people may enjoy more political and civil liberties and escape the abject economic misery which fueled their initial uprisings.
On the other hand, deposing the old regimes created a significant degree of instability and insecurity across the region. Libya and Yemen essentially remain countries awash with well-armed rival militia groups, weak central control, and a real risk of sliding ever further into civil war. The aftermath of the UN/NATO-backed revolution in Libya, in particular, has also had serious regional ramifications such as exacerbating already tense situations in Mali and Niger. Arguably even worse, where old regimes have, so far, managed to cling on to power, such as in Syria and Bahrain, human suffering has increased tremendously.
There is considerable debate about whether or not it is possible to simultaneously build a democracy and maintain peace in the aftermath of violent regime transitions. There is also mounting evidence that three ‘ingredients’ are essential in managing such transitions and their aftermath successfully: leadership, diplomacy, and institutional design.
Based on my own work on ethnic conflict and civil war, and more recently on the Arab Spring (especially on Libya and Yemen), I found that these ‘ingredients’ are valuable factors to consider when we try to understand the complexities and varied outcomes of the Arab Spring. In Yemen, the UN, with the backing of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Friends of Yemen, managed to negotiate an end to the stand-off between the regime and different groups of opponents. Yet the situation in the country remains highly volatile. New and inclusive institutions are yet to emerge. A process of negotiating a new institutional design that can lay the foundations for a democratic and united Yemen still needs to be agreed among a group of leaders that was never united by much more than opposition to the regime of Abdullah Ali Saleh. Saleh, together with key allies, remains a powerful influence in Yemen with the ability, at for the foreseeable future, to derail any attempts at a genuinely clean break with the past.
Competing visions of the future also mar Libya’s prospects for achieving a stable and secure democratic state. Claims for autonomy in the east, turf battles between militia groups in the west and south who once fought side by side to oust Gadhafi, and a poorly resourced central government continue to be serious impediments to Libya’s transition. International support and influence, key in aiding the success of the revolution, have waned in light of other, more pressing problems—from the deteriorating situation in Syria to the uncertainty surrounding Iran’s nuclear program.
It would be easy to fault the international community, or individual actors within it, for not “managing” the Arab Spring in a better way because of exaggerated expectations, wrong analyses of in-country and regional situations, short attention span, limited resources, and an essentially self-serving agenda. All this is true. Diplomacy could have been, and should be, more effective, including its coercive side. International diplomats could have made more of an effort to understand local dynamics and assist with designing transparent, accountable, and inclusive institutions.
Yet, quite similar to transitions after civil war and ethnic conflict, we also need to be realistic about what the broader international community is able to achieve in the face of local leaders unwilling to compromise and to spare their countries’ citizens from violence, poverty, and a lack of real opportunity for a better future. Unless and until local leaders rise to the challenge of building such a better future for their countries, the impact of international efforts will remain limited.
This article was first published on Science Voices on 21 May 2012.
Stefan Wolff is a professor of international security at the University of Birmingham. A political scientist by background, he specializes in the management of contemporary international security challenges, especially in the prevention, management and settlement of ethnic conflicts and in post-conflict stabilization and state-building in deeply divided and war-torn societies. He is co-founder of Leadership in Conflict, an initiative dedicated to helping leaders in conflict and post-conflict zones to rise to the challenges that confront them. He can be found via http://www.stefanwolff.com and @stefwolff.
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